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Faculty and Deans

RESPONSE
The Constitution of Agency Statutory
Interpretation
Evan J. Criddle*
INTRODUCTION
Within the field of federal statutory interpretation, there is a
zone where courts refuse to tread. As the Supreme Court famously
explained in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,1 courts will not second-guess a federal administrative agency’s
reasonable interpretation of a statute it administers when it is
“apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other
statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be
able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the
statute or fills a space in the enacted law.”2 Chevron deference thus
carves out a “space”3 within which agencies may interpret statutes as
they think best—even changing their interpretations over time—
without fear of judicial interference as long as they provide a reasoned
justification and comply with applicable procedural requirements.4
Some legal scholars have argued that Chevron deference charts
the boundary between law and policy.5 Their argument can be
*
Cabell Research Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. The author expresses
sincere appreciation to Professor Aaron Saiger and editors at the Vanderbilt Law Review for the
invitation to contribute this Essay, and to Aaron Bruhl, Hannah Frank, and Glen Staszewski for
helpful comments and conversations that informed this work. Any errors and omissions are, of
course, my responsibility alone.
1.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
3.
Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them Chevron “Space” and
Skidmore “Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012).
4.
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
5.
See, e.g., Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 187 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Agencies
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summarized roughly as follows: when a statute’s text is amenable to
multiple readings (Chevron step one) and each of those readings is
objectively “reasonable” (Chevron step two), a court has effectively
exhausted the resources of legal analysis. From that point forward, the
choice between reasonable statutory interpretations turns on extralegal policy considerations that fall outside the heartland of judicial
expertise. Rather than answer such questions through independent
judgment, courts wisely defer to the agency that administers the
statute, recognizing that the executive branch is usually in a better
position to decide controversial questions of regulatory policy for a host
of reasons such as expertise, political accountability, and congressional
expectations.6 According to this view, Chevron deference empowers a
federal agency to exploit statutory ambiguities and gaps in order to
promote its own independent policy preferences and the incumbent
administration’s political agenda.7
Not everyone accepts this reading of Chevron. In an article
published recently in the Vanderbilt Law Review, Professor Aaron
Saiger argues that Chevron does not, in fact, give agencies a blank check
to adopt any “reasonable” statutory interpretation.8 According to
Professor Saiger, when a federal agency engages in statutory
interpretation, its ethical “duties parallel those of the judge in a case
where no deference is offered.”9 The agency therefore bears an ethical
obligation to draw on “available interpretive tools to reach the best
account it can of what a statute means”10 rather than “chase any policy
[it] can reasonably square with the statute.”11 This obligation to seek
the best interpretation of a statute applies with full force, he argues,

Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They Administer: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 200 (2007); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
273 (2011); Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 821, 822–24 (1990).
6.
See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 5, at 289 (arguing that Chevron deference is based on a
“policy-interference avoidance principle” whereby courts refrain “from second guessing a decision
by a political branch when doing so will require the court to rely heavily on policy” rather than
law).
7.
See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting
that when an agency chooses between reasonable statutory interpretations under Chevron, its task
is “not to find the best meaning of the text, but to formulate legally binding rules to fill in gaps
based on policy judgments made by the agency rather than Congress”); Adrian Vermeule, Our
Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1131 (2009) (suggesting that the “openended” character of Chevron steps one and two “creates proven scope for various ideological
influences in Chevron’s application”).
8.
Aaron Saiger, Agencies’ Obligation to Interpret the Statute, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1231 (2016).
9.
Id. at 1234.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1237.
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even when Chevron prevents courts from testing the interpretation
through judicial review.12
Professor Saiger deserves praise for challenging the
conventional wisdom that federal agencies are free to pursue their own
policy preferences when operating within Chevron’s zone of discretion.
In this invited Response Essay, I endorse Professor Saiger’s central
thesis while proposing some friendly amendments that are intended to
fortify his argument. Although I agree that federal agencies are subject
to norms that constrain their choice of statutory interpretations within
Chevron’s zone of discretion, I suggest that these norms should be
characterized slightly differently, and I propose a more fully developed
account of the legal basis for these obligations.13 Professor Saiger claims
that an agency’s obligation to seek the “best interpretation”14 of
statutory provisions derives from (1) the idea that agencies are “pure
creatures of their statutes” without independent policymaking
authority and (2) the principle of “legislative supremacy,” which
subordinates agency policymaking to statutory directives.15 In contrast,
I argue that an agency’s obligation to set aside its own independent
policy preferences in favor of legislative policy judgments rests
primarily on a different legal foundation: the constitutional
requirement that Congress must supply an authoritative “intelligible
principle” to guide agency discretion whenever it entrusts lawmaking
authority to an agency.16 Because the nondelegation doctrine prohibits
Congress from empowering a federal agency to make law without
supplying an intelligible principle to channel agency discretion, an
12. See id. at 1245–46 (analogizing agency discretion to prosecutorial discretion, which is
regulated by ethical norms).
13. Professor Saiger appears to embrace the idea that an agency’s obligation to choose the
“best” interpretation has a legal dimension, see id. at 1232 (characterizing the requirement “to
select the best interpretation of its governing statute” as both “a legal and ethical duty”), but he
frames his article primarily as an inquiry into the ethics of statutory interpretation, see id. at 1237
(“This Article is about [the] ‘morals’ [of statutory interpretation].”), 1240 (“This Article . . . is
concerned with . . . government ethics—namely obligations that actors . . . have in connection with
the execution of their public duties.”). Agencies bear ethical obligations of faithful interpretation,
he argues, because an agency’s role-oriented authority is akin to that of an agency lawyer who, in
the words of Geoffrey Miller, “acts unethically when she substitutes her individual moral judgment
for that of a political process which is generally accepted as legitimate.” Id. at 1244 (quoting
Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1293, 1337 (1987)). Although I have some quibbles with the framing of his ethical argument,
including his characterization of my own previous writings on the fiduciary character of
administrative law as “ethical analysis,” id. at 1244, for purposes of this brief Response Essay I
will focus exclusively on explaining the possible legal basis for the obligations he proposes.
14. Id. at 1237.
15. Id. at 1274.
16. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 426 (1944).
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agency bears a corresponding constitutional obligation to conduct
statutory interpretation in a manner that focuses on “faithfully”
following this legislative guidance rather than pursuing its own
independent policy preferences.17 This constitutional obligation of
fidelity to an agency’s statutory mandate is a legal conduct rule that
regulates agency statutory interpretation even when Chevron’s
deferential decision rules limit judicial review.18 Consequently, federal
agencies lack authority under the Constitution to treat Chevron
deference as a license to advance policy agendas that are unmoored
from relevant legislative guidance and constitutional norms.
The remainder of this Essay is divided into two parts. Part I
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Professor Saiger’s critique
and explains why further attention to the Constitution’s intelligible
principle requirement is necessary to explain why agencies may not fill
statutory “gaps” with their own independent policy preferences. Part II
problematizes Professor Saiger’s effort to distinguish statutory
interpretation from policymaking by calling attention to the important
conceptual distinction between “statutory interpretation” (which seeks
to recover semantic meaning) and “statutory construction” (which seeks
to distill a statute’s legal meaning by applying relevant legal norms). I
argue that statutory construction occupies a space between
interpretation and policymaking, because it enlists agencies as
collaborators with Congress in the dynamic authorship of a regulatory
regime. Yet, regardless of whether an agency engages in interpretation
or construction, it is never permitted to bypass constitutional and
statutory norms in favor of its own independent policy preferences.
Even when Chevron calls for judicial deference, the constitutional
foundations of agency statutory interpretation dictate that federal
agencies, as public fiduciaries,19 are legally obligated to use their best
judgment to fulfill their statutory mandates in good faith, not to pursue
their own independent policy agendas or the political objectives of the
incumbent administration.

17.
18.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES AND MORALS OF LEGISLATION 430 (W. Harrison ed., 1948) (1789) (distinguishing
conduct rules from decision rules); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 628 (1983) (same).
19. See Evan J. Criddle, Mending Holes in the Rule of (Administrative) Law, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. 1271 (2010); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation
in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 441 (2010) [hereinafter Criddle, Fiduciary
Administration]; Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV.
117 (2006).
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I
In recent years, legal scholars have devoted increasing attention
to the law and practice of agency statutory interpretation.20 Much of the
resulting literature explores differences between the respective
institutional roles of judges and federal agencies.21 Professor Saiger’s
recent article, in contrast, emphasizes an important point of
commonality between judicial and agency statutory interpretation:
both judges and agency heads22 are legally and ethically obligated to
“obey the Constitution and conform to the laws.”23 An agency’s duty to
obey the law “cannot be less demanding” within Chevron’s zone of
reasonableness, Professor Saiger argues, just because it “knows that it
will not face judicial review.”24 Rather, an agency must always “act
within its best assessment of its legislatively granted powers.”25
Accordingly, when agencies confront statutory ambiguity, they should
embrace the interpretation that they believe best captures a statute’s
meaning. Professor Saiger does not dispute that reasonable minds may
disagree about the best interpretive methodology for discerning the
meaning of ambiguous statutory directives (e.g., textualism,
purposivism).26 Nonetheless, he argues that debates over statutory
interpretation methodology should not obscure the fundamental
principle that an agency bears an ethical duty to “hew to the
20. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 411; Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How
Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673 (2007);
Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501 (2005); Pierce, supra note 5; Kevin M.
Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV.
871 (2015); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to
Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI. KENT L. REV. 321
(1990); Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999 (2015);
Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming).
21. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 20; Foote, supra note 20.
22. Professor Saiger uses the terms “agency” and “agency head” interchangeably, in
recognition of the fact that the officials who lead an agency are ultimately responsible for directing
agency statutory interpretation. See Saiger, supra note 8, at 1238–39.
23. Id. at 1247; see also 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2012) (requiring agency officials to swear an oath to
“support and defend the Constitution of the United States . . . ; bear true faith and allegiance to
the same; . . . and . . . well and faithfully discharge the duties of [their] office”); 28 U.S.C. § 453
(2012) (requiring federal judges to swear an oath to “faithfully and impartially discharge and
perform all the duties incumbent upon me . . . under the Constitution and laws of the United
States”).
24. Saiger, supra note 8, at 1247.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 1255 (“Agencies can interpret statutes in good faith using a variety of
methodologies.”).
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interpretation that the agency itself determines, in good faith, to be the
best interpretation,” rather than simply selecting any of several
readings that the statutory text can plausibly bear.27
This effort to rein in agency statutory interpretation is
motivated by important practical, conceptual, and normative concerns.
Practically speaking, Professor Saiger worries that Chevron deference
has emboldened the executive branch to test the limits of judicial
tolerance, common sense, and the rule of law by endorsing
“adventurous” statutory interpretations that reflect the incumbent
administration’s views on optimal policy rather than the agency’s best
understanding of the statute’s actual meaning.28 Notably, Professor
Saiger’s article arrives at a moment when political conservatives have
accused the Obama Administration of launching sweeping policy
initiatives without plausible congressional approval, including
purportedly “unilateral” executive action on gun control and deferred
immigration enforcement.29 Professor Saiger appears to share critics’
concerns that these measures reflect shoddy statutory interpretation.
In particular, he laments that the Obama Administration reportedly
formulated its controversial gun control and immigration policies first
and only later “scour[ed]” existing legislation “to find some implausible
but not crazy legal hook for [its] actions.”30 He suggests that this
approach to statutory interpretation is unethical, because it does not
reflect a good faith effort to treat statutory interpretation as an
interpretive activity that respects the principle of legislative
supremacy.31
Although Professor Saiger focuses on initiatives that have
rankled political conservatives, his critique of the Obama
Administration’s approach to statutory interpretation transcends
partisan ideology. Liberals have raised similar concerns about the
Administration’s aggressive interpretation of Congress’s post-9/11
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”).32 Although the
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1267 (quoting E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine
Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
1, 3 (2005)).
29. See id. at 1267–68 (citing, inter alia, Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The
Obama Administration's Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013); David Bernstein, Obama: “Scrub Existing Legal
Authorities” to Take Executive Action on Guns?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 1, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/01/01/obama-scrub-existinglegal-authorities-to-take-executive-action-on-guns/ [https://perma.cc/RD7P-KLFF]).
30. Id. at 1268 (quoting Bernstein, supra note 29).
31. Id. at 1268–1270.
32. Publ. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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AUMF speaks only of military action against “nations, organizations,
or persons” who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided the [9/11]
terrorist attacks . . . or harbored such organizations or persons,” the
White House has interpreted the text as a virtual blank check to
conduct counter-terrorism operations against groups and individuals
who pose a threat to the United States, irrespective of whether these
targets played a role in the 9/11 attacks.33 Liberal dissatisfaction with
aggressive agency statutory interpretation will undoubtedly increase in
the future as the incoming Trump Administration abandons
established agency statutory interpretations dealing with topics such
as climate change, immigration, and health care. Indeed, PresidentElect Trump has already attracted criticism for his clumsy effort to find
an “implausible but not crazy” statutory basis to compel Mexico to pay
for the construction of a wall on the U.S.-Mexico Border.34 As Professor
Saiger astutely observes, Chevron deference—and the culture of
executive branch activism that it has inspired—may be partly to blame
for such measures, because it has emboldened agencies to pursue
result-oriented interpretations that do not actually reflect their best
judgments about the meaning of a statutory text.35
At a more conceptual level, Professor Saiger’s article challenges
the conventional wisdom that statutory ambiguities reflect an express
or implicit delegation of policymaking authority to agencies. Here,
Professor Saiger wages an uphill battle: not only does his thesis

33. See, e.g., Rebecca Ingber, Co-Belligerency, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2017) (“[A]s
things stand today, the public can only discover that we are at war with a particular group not
because Congress declares it, not because the Executive declares it, not even because the group
attacks us, but rather because we attack them.”); Greg Miller & Karen DeYoung, In Syria, Obama
Stretches Legal and Policy Constraints He Created for Counterterrorism, WASH. POST (Sept. 23,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-syria-obama-stretches-legaland-policy-constraints-he-created-for-counterterrorism/2014/09/23/79fdaf44-4339-11e4-9a15137aa0153527_story.html [https://perma.cc/9YK-TMNW] (noting Senator Tim Kaine’s concern
that allowing the White House to use the AUMF as a legal basis for military action against the
Islamic State in Syria would set “a horrible precedent”).
34. See Memo Explains How Donald Trump Plans To Pay for Border Wall, WASH. POST.,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/politics/memo-explains-how-donald-trump-plansto-pay-for-border-wall/2007/ [https://perma.cc/6YDP-CNG8]. Trump has proposed, inter alia, that
the executive branch reinterpret the USA Patriot Act to prevent undocumented workers from
sending money remittances to Mexico until the Mexican government relents and agrees to pay for
a border wall. For a critique of this proposal’s legal coherence, see Stephen Heifetz & Kaitlin
Cassel, Trump’s Mexico Remittance Proposal Goes Inexplicably Awry, STEPTOE INT’L COMPLIANCE
BLOG (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.steptoeinternationalcomplianceblog.com/2016/04/trumpsmexico-remittance-proposal-goes-inexplicably-awry/ [https://perma.cc/NQD3-7GGF].
35. Saiger, supra note 8, at 1255, 1266–69. Professor Saiger argues that jurists may disagree
about what statutory interpretation methodology is actually best from a legal point of view, while
still accepting that agencies bear an ethical obligation to adopt the interpretation that they believe
is “best” according to their own favored methodology. Id. at 1255.
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challenge the views of many prominent legal scholars,36 but it also flies
in the face of the Supreme Court’s own formal justification for Chevron
deference. According to the Court, Chevron is premised on the idea “that
ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer
are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in
reasonable fashion.”37 When Congress commits an ambiguous federal
statute to an agency’s administration, it expressly or implicitly
authorizes the agency to fill in the missing details according to the
agency’s own view of wise policy. Judicial deference to agency statutory
interpretation is appropriate, the Court has explained, because filling
“gaps” in statutes “involves difficult policy choices that agencies are
better equipped to make than courts.”38
This justification for Chevron is vulnerable to the criticism that
it improperly characterizes all uncertainties in statutory interpretation
as “gaps.” To better appreciate the inadequacy of this “gap” metaphor,
consider the following scenario, as described by the Tenth Circuit:
Buried deep in our immigration laws lie . . . two provisions: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(i)(2)(A) and
1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). Enacted first, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) grants the Attorney General discretion
to “adjust the status” of those who have entered the country illegally and afford them
lawful residency. But growing concerns about illegal immigration eventually induced
Congress to enact § 1182(a), which appears to take away at least part of the discretion
§ 1255(i) gives. Among other things, [it] provides that certain persons who have entered
the country illegally more than once are categorically prohibited from winning lawful
residency here—that is, unless they first serve a ten-year waiting period outside our
borders.39

Recognizing that the relationship between these facially
contradictory provisions was unclear, the Tenth Circuit concluded in De
Niz Robles v. Lynch that the agency was free to choose either of two
“reasonable” interpretations: it could hold that § 1182(a) eliminated the
Attorney General’s discretionary power to adjust status for covered
individuals, or it could conclude that § 1182(a) preserved the Attorney
General’s status-adjustment power.40 The court justified deference to
36. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 5 (asserting that within Chevron’s zone of reasonableness,
agencies are free to engage in “a policy-making process”).
37. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005); see
also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 (2012) (“Chevron and
later cases find in unambiguous language a clear sign that Congress did not delegate gap-filling
authority to an agency; and they find in ambiguous language at least a presumptive indication
that Congress did delegate that gap-filling authority.”); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (characterizing Chevron as “an implicit delegation from Congress
to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps”); Pierce, supra note 5, at 982 (“Chevron’s premise is that
it is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.”).
38. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980.
39. De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015).
40. See id. at 1167–68 (discussing Padilla-Caldera v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1140, 1153 (10th Cir.
2011)).
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the agency based on the idea that the facial conflict between § 1255(i)
and § 1182(a) reflected a “gap” that the agency could “exploit” to further
its independent policy preferences:
[T]o reach Chevron step two the agency must first establish that traditional tools of
statutory interpretation fail to reveal “what the law has always meant.” At that point the
agency—avowedly and self-consciously—exploits the law’s ambiguity and exercises its
“delegated” “policy-making” authority to write a new rule of general applicability
according to its vision of the law as it should be. . . . [C]ourts defer to the agency’s new
view because the agency has been authorized to fill gaps in statutory law with its own
policy judgments.41

This gap-filling rationale for Chevron deference does not ring
true as applied to the question presented in De Niz Robles. To be sure,
Congress may have expected the agency (not the courts) to take the
leading role in clarifying the ambiguous relationship between § 1255(i)
and § 1182(a).42 But the apparent conflict between these provisions is
not the type of statutory silence that one would ordinarily characterize
as a “gap.” Nor does it seem likely that Congress would have expected
“the agency—avowedly and self-consciously”—to “exploit” the facial
conflict between these provisions in order to advance its “own policy
judgments” or “vision of the law as it should be.”43 After all, the entire
purpose of § 1182(a) was to reduce the Attorney General’s discretionary
power; the only uncertainty was how much power Congress had
actually withdrawn. Granted, even in this context Congress likely
would have expected the agency to take the lead in resolving the facial
contradiction between the two provisions. But it defies common sense
to suggest, as the Tenth Circuit does, that Congress would have given
the agency carte blanche to resolve the issue based on policy
considerations that were alien to the legislative priorities embodied in
the relevant statutory provisions.
Professor Saiger would likely argue that the Tenth Circuit’s
error runs deeper than simply mischaracterizing the agency’s statutory
interpretation as “gap-filing” or misconstruing Congress’s expectations.
In his view, the heart of the case against unfettered agency statutory
interpretation is normative and structural: because agencies are,
formally speaking, “pure creatures of their statutes” without inherent

41. Id. at 1173.
42. Recent empirical studies offer some support for the idea that Congress consciously
legislates against the backdrop of Chevron deference. See, e.g., Abbe L. Gluck & Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Agency Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman
& Abbe L. Gluck, Agency Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014).
43. De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1173.
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constitutional authority,44 they must be able to trace every exercise of
administrative authority to a statutory source.45 Accordingly, Professor
Saiger concludes that when an agency does not seek to discern and
apply a statute’s “best interpretation” in good faith, its
interpretations—however reasonable on their face—are “ultra vires.”46
Agencies must therefore resist the seductive idea that statutory
“ambiguity authorizes agencies to chase any policy agenda they can
reasonably square with the statute.”47
There are at least two potential weaknesses in this line of
argument. The first is that the conclusion does not follow from the
premises. Even if it were true that an agency’s authority is constituted
exclusively by statute, it is possible that an agency still might not bear
a legal or ethical obligation to pursue the “best interpretation” of a
statute rather than pursue the interpretation that best accords with
their own views of wise policy. After all, Chevron embraces the idea that
statutory gaps and ambiguities reflect delegations of discretionary
power to agencies, and these delegations could very well include
authorization to fill gaps with extraneous policy considerations. If at
least some statutes do contain “gaps” that cannot be erased in a
mechanical fashion using traditional tools of statutory interpretation,
it is unclear under Professor Saiger’s theory why the task of filling these
gaps should be conceptualized as an exercise in “interpretation” rather
than “policymaking.”
To establish that agencies bear an “obligation to interpret the
statute” when they operate within Chevron’s zone of agency discretion,
Professor Saiger must first demonstrate that the Supreme Court has it
wrong: there is no such thing as a statutory “gap,” because all questions
of statutory interpretation can be resolved through legal interpretation.
Professor Saiger doesn’t explain, however, why we should believe that
statutory “gaps” are chimerical.
A second weakness in Professor Saiger’s argument is that it does
not fully account for the President’s independent constitutional
authority.48 Recall that the Supreme Court in Chevron opined that

44. Saiger, supra note 8, at 1274.
45. See id. at 1272–73 (arguing that because “legal grants of power, and legal restrictions
upon that power, must be understood as prior to the exercise of the power they delineate,” agency
statutory interpretation likewise “should be intellectually prior” to extrinsic policy considerations).
46. Id. at 1274
47. Id. at 1237.
48. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115
YALE L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006) (arguing that the executive branch has inherent power “to prescribe
incidental details needed to carry into execution a legislative scheme, even in the absence of any
congressional authorization to compete that theme”).
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judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation was appropriate,
in part, because “an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation,
properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy
to inform its judgments.”49 When an agency bases its statutory
interpretations on the President’s considered policy preferences, the
interpretations arguably draw their authority not only from the
statutory text itself, but also from the President’s independent Article
II power.50 Some legal scholars believe that this link to the President is
sufficient to justify agencies basing their statutory interpretations on
policy considerations that lack a clear basis in the statute itself.51
Professor Saiger appears to take the position that an agency may
not rely upon the President’s independent constitutional authority as a
basis for grafting executive policy preferences onto statutes, because
this is foreclosed by the principle of “legislative supremacy”52: both the
President and federal agencies are bound by the terms of validly
enacted statutes. Once again, however, Professor Saiger’s argument is
missing a crucial step. Federal statutes trump executive policymaking
only if they expressly or implicitly address the question at hand. If a
statute does not actually resolve the relevant issue, but instead merely
delegates the issue’s resolution to an administering agency (as the
Supreme Court traditionally presumes under Chevron), there is no true
conflict between the principle of legislative supremacy and the idea that
an agency may pursue the President’s views of wise policy.
Consequently, neither the statutory basis of agency authority nor the
principle of legislative supremacy are sufficient to ground a general
obligation for agencies to seek the “best interpretation” of an ambiguous
statute.
What Professor Saiger needs to complete his argument is a
robust justification for the idea that statutes impose legal obligations
that channel and constrain agency interpretation even when Chevron
deference applies, because the specific provisions under review are
capable of sustaining more than one reasonable interpretation.

49. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
50. See id. at 865–66 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently
did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration
of the statute in light of everyday realities.”).
51. See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 48, at 2298–2301 (arguing that the executive
branch’s inherent “completion power” can explain the Chevron doctrine).
52. Saiger, supra note 8, at 1247.
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Fortunately, Professor Kevin Stack has supplied the missing
link in an illuminating article on agency statutory interpretation.53
Professor Stack argues that the modern nondelegation doctrine has
important implications for statutory interpretation in the
administrative state. By requiring Congress to supply a statutory
“intelligible principle” whenever it delegates authority to agencies, the
nondelegation doctrine guarantees that federal agencies are never
consigned to craft regulatory policy in a policy vacuum; instead, they
always have statutory principles or policy considerations that govern
their exercise of discretionary authority.54 As a result, even when a
statutory provision can sustain multiple reasonable interpretations, the
nondelegation doctrine ensures that statutes provide at least general
guidance to inform an agency’s choice between these alternatives.55
Professor Stack uses these observations to buttress the popular
idea that agencies should employ a purposive approach to statutory
interpretation.56 Professor Saiger resists this conclusion, arguing that
Professor Stack “falls short of justifying purposivist interpretation as
the ‘best’ sort of interpretation,” because agencies could conceivably
adopt a textualist interpretive methodology without acting illegally or
unethically.57 Although I am personally persuaded by Professor Stack’s
argument, we need not choose sides in this debate to embrace Professor
Stack’s deeper insight that the intelligible principle requirement
formally precludes Congress from conferring “unconfined and vagrant”
discretion on agencies.58 To the extent that the Constitution requires
Congress to embed intelligible principles in regulatory statutes, both
textualists and purposivists should be able to accept that the principle
of legislative supremacy requires agencies to respect these principles as
authoritative guidance when addressing statutory ambiguities,
silences, contradictions, and other puzzles. For this reason alone, the
idea that agencies may turn to “the incumbent administration’s views
of wise policy” rather than seeking in good faith to apply a statute’s

53. Stack, supra note 20.
54. Id. at 893–94 (citing, inter alia, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)).
55. Significantly, Stack’s insight that the intelligible principle requirement constrains
statutory delegations applies equally to statutes that delegate authority directly to the President,
see, e.g., Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), so the fact that an agency may follow White
House policy direction when interpreting statutes cannot cure an otherwise standardless
delegation, cf. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472–73 (holding that an agency may not cure a
standardless delegation by designing its own intelligible principle).
56. Stack, supra note 20, at 893–95.
57. Saiger, supra note 8, at 1254–55.
58. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).
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intelligible principle is antithetical to bedrock constitutional
principles.59
Ultimately, therefore, Professor Saiger is right to argue that
agencies may not treat Chevron deference as a reservoir of unregulated
discretion that they may “exploit” however they wish. Although
Chevron prevents courts from challenging agencies’ reasonable
interpretations of ambiguous statutes, this does not mean that
statutory ambiguities present a blank slate on which agencies may
inscribe their own independent policy preferences. The nondelegation
doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating unfettered lawmaking
authority through ambiguous or incomplete legislative drafting. To
satisfy constitutional scrutiny, every legislative delegation must be
accompanied by an intelligible principle capable of guiding an agency’s
exercise of discretion at every phase of statutory interpretation.
Agencies bear a concomitant obligation to exercise their interpretive
authority in a manner that is conscientiously focused on “faithfully
execut[ing]” their statutory mandates.60 As a result, an agency’s
obligation to interpret and discharge its mandate in good faith is not
merely a question of administrative ethics or best practices; it is a
constitutional requirement.
II
Thus far, I have argued that constitutional principles require
federal agencies to interpret ambiguous statutory provisions in
accordance with Congress’s “intelligible principle” rather than resort to
their own independent policy preferences or the incumbent
administration’s political agenda. In this Part, I take up Professor
Saiger’s invitation to consider more fully “what ethical selfunderstanding an agency should have when it selects an interpretation”
within Chevron’s zone of discretion.61 Professor Saiger argues that we
should conceptualize federal agencies as “assignees”62 of interpretive
authority that “must give force to the meaning it understands the
statute to have.”63 A federal agency must therefore focus on

59. If Chevron were based on the premise that agencies may “fill in gaps based on policy
judgments made by the agency rather than Congress,” there would be merit to Justice Clarence
Thomas’s concern that Chevron raises “serious” constitutional questions. See Michigan v. EPA,
135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
60. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
61. Saiger, supra note 8, at 1236.
62. Id. at 1237.
63. Id. at 1274.
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“interpretation” rather than “policymaking.”64 In the discussion that
follows, I seek to unsettle this understanding of an agency’s
institutional role. I argue that when agencies administer ambiguous
statutes, they are necessarily forced to make discretionary normative
judgments that entail recourse to policy considerations. Nonetheless,
the discretionary character of agency statutory construction does not
exempt agencies from the legal requirement to discharge their
purposive statutory mandates in good faith. This legal conduct rule
remains in full force, displacing extraneous policy considerations, when
agency statutory constructions qualify for Chevron deference.
Professor Saiger’s conception of agencies as assignees of
interpretive power rests on the premise that statutory administration
can be divided into two modes: “interpretation” and “policymaking.”
Agency statutory interpretation is consistent with the principle of
legislative supremacy, he argues, but independent agency policymaking
is not.65 Legal scholars have come to recognize, however, that there is a
third mode of agency administration—statutory construction—that
occupies an intermediate position between pure interpretation and pure
policymaking. In contrast to statutory interpretation, which seeks to
identify “the linguistic meaning of an authoritative legal text,”
statutory construction draws on legal norms embedded in the statutory
text and the broader legal system to discern the legal meaning of the
text’s semantic content as applied to particular cases.66 Statutory
construction does not entail free-form policymaking, because it is
subject to textual and normative constraints. Nonetheless, statutory
construction is an inescapably juris-generative activity, because the
decision maker exercises discretionary judgment to construct the
statute’s legal meaning through a creative process that integrates the
relevant textual and normative considerations into a coherent account
of the statute’s legal import.
Professor Michael Herz has argued that this distinction between
statutory interpretation and construction “maps tidily onto Chevron.”67
In his view, statutory interpretation “corresponds to Chevron’s step
64. Id. at 1237.
65. See id. at 1237 (“Legislative supremacy and fidelity to the statute, rather than good
policy, should be the agency’s ‘moral’ lodestar.”).
66. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
95, 100, 103 (2010); see generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism
and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641 (2013); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and
Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011).
67. Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1895
(2015). As Professor Herz observes, however, courts tend to use the terms “interpretation” and
“construction” interchangeably when applying Chevron. Id. at 1892.
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one,” where courts employ traditional tools of statutory interpretation—
“examining language, purpose, and legislative history”—to identify a
statute’s linguistic meaning. Once a court determines at step one that
a “statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,”68
however, “[i]nterpretation . . . forsakes us” and the court withdraws to
allow the agency to take the lead in statutory construction.69 The role
of courts at Chevron step two, therefore, is simply to ensure that an
agency’s chosen construction is “reasonable” or “permissible”70 (i.e., that
it is not premised on interpretations that are inconsistent with a
statute’s semantic meaning). Thus, Professor Herz suggests that
Chevron’s two steps correspond neatly with statutory interpretation
and construction.71
This argument is not convincing. To accept this account, we
would have to conclude that courts exhaust the task of statutory
interpretation at Chevron steps one and two, then pass the baton to
agencies to conduct statutory construction. But this is plainly not how
Chevron works. Step one does not entrust statutory interpretation
solely to the courts: when courts encounter semantic ambiguities in a
statute, Chevron counsels that they should defer to an agency’s
reasonable efforts to clarify the statute’s linguistic meaning based, in
part, on its expertise in the relevant field. Nor do courts limit their
review under Chevron to the semantic meaning of a statute. Instead,
they routinely consider substantive norms, such as constitutional
concerns, at step one to determining whether agency statutory
constructions are consistent with the text’s clear and unambiguous
legal meaning.72 Moreover, when normative considerations suggest that
68.
69.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
Herz, supra note 67, at 1895 (quoting FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL
HERMENEUTICS: PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND POLITICS, WITH
REMARKS ON PRECEDENTS AND AUTHORITIES 111 (William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed. 1880)).
70. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
71. Herz, supra note 67, at 1896 (quoting Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 469–72 (2013)); see also Jeffrey Pojanowski,
After Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (“If there is too large a linguistic leap from the
‘interpreted’ text to the rule itself, a reviewing court will find that the agency made law rather
than interpreted it.”).
72. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”); Solum, supra note 66, at
113 (observing that “so-called ‘substantive canons’ are clear examples of canons of construction”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 459 (1989)
(“Interpretive principles are often a product of constitutional norms.”); Jonathan D. Urick, Note,
Chevron and Constitutional Doubt, 99 VAND. L. REV. 375 (2013) (arguing that the constitutional
avoidance doctrine is a mandatory—not merely prudential—limit on agency statutory
interpretation).
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an agency has adopted an unreasonable construction of the statute,
courts do not hesitate to set aside the construction at Chevron step
two—even if the construction is plausibly within the range of linguistic
meanings that the statutory text can bear.73 Thus, Chevron’s two steps
clearly are not designed to separate statutory interpretation from
statutory construction.
Nonetheless, understanding the interpretation/construction
distinction helps to clarify how agencies should understand the nature
of their own role in statutory administration. When agencies administer
statutes, their task is not merely to discern the semantic meaning of
statutory provisions through interpretation but also to translate that
semantic meaning into legal meaning through statutory construction.
When the issue before an agency is a choice between different
understandings of a statute’s semantic meaning, an agency bears a duty
to choose the best interpretation. Other questions, however, call for
statutory construction. For example, a statute’s semantic content may
be vague rather than ambiguous,74 forcing the administering agency to
draw distinctions that cannot be derived mechanically from the
linguistic meaning of the statutory text. Or a statute may contain
facially contradictory provisions that cannot be reconciled solely
through textual analysis of the statute’s semantic content (e.g., De Niz
Robles). Statutory silences also call for construction, because they
supply no text to interpret.75 In each of these contexts, a statute’s legal
meaning must be constructed by synthesizing the text’s linguistic
meaning with legal norms that find expression in the Constitution, the
statute, and other relevant sources of law. This is the task of statutory
construction, not interpretation.
The distinction between statutory interpretation and statutory
construction complicates the story Professor Saiger wants to tell (i.e.,
that agencies should pursue a statute’s “meaning” without reliance on
“policy, adherence to a political agenda, or considerations of the public
good).”76 As Professor Lawrence Solum has observed, statutory
construction—unlike statutory interpretation—is a normative
enterprise that necessarily draws on legal norms that are rarely made
explicit in a statute’s text:
The correctness of an interpretation does not depend on our normative theories about
what the law should be. But construction is not like interpretation in this regard—the
production of legal rules cannot be “value neutral” because we cannot tell whether a
73. See, e.g., Republican Nat’l Cmt. v. FEC, 76 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
74. Id. at 97–98 (discussing the distinction between vagueness and ambiguity).
75. See Solum, supra note 66, at 106–07 (discussing vagueness, contradictions, and silences
as examples of contexts that call for construction).
76. Saiger, supra note 8, at 1274.
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construction is correct or incorrect without resort to legal norms. And legal norms,
themselves, can only be justified by some kind of normative argument.77

Consequently, statutory construction is not simply an effort to recover
a textual meaning that exists as an objective fact that is “intellectually
prior” to the act of construction.78 Instead, statutory construction
constitutes statutory meaning through an act of juris-generative
judgment that draws on normative considerations.79
Once the interpretation/construction distinction comes clearly
into view, we can better make sense of Chevron’s suggestion that
statutory “ambiguities” and “gaps” reflect “delegations” to
administrative agencies.80 Chevron rests on the premise that when
Congress entrusts an agency with responsibility to administer a
statute, it also entrusts the agency with primary responsibility to
resolve linguistic ambiguities in the statute, selecting what it believes
in good faith to be the best reading of the text from among the various
plausible semantic meanings. Once the agency has identified a statute’s
linguistic meaning, Chevron contemplates that the agency will also take
the lead in statutory construction, determining the appropriate legal
ramifications of the statute’s linguistic meaning in light of relevant
normative considerations. Unlike statutory interpretation, the task of
statutory construction does invite agencies to fill statutory “gaps,”
specify the application of vaguely worded provisions, and resolve
apparent contradictions by drawing on “policy” concerns and
“considerations of the public good.” When agencies administer statutes,
their role is not merely to avoid “error” in discerning a statute’s
linguistic meaning but to exercise discretion in constructing the
statute’s legal meaning from the applicable legal considerations. Thus,
normative judgment is part and parcel of agency statutory construction.
Nonetheless, the fact that agency statutory construction invites
recourse to normative considerations does not mean that agencies have
free rein to indulge their own idiosyncratic policy preferences or
political agendas. Statutory construction, like statutory interpretation,
is subject to binding legal norms that constrain how agencies may
define a statute’s legal meaning.81 In particular, agency statutory
construction is governed by two types of norms: (1) regime-specific
norms specified by Congress and (2) trans-substantive norms that
address broader systemic concerns. These two categories of norms apply

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See Solum, supra note 66, at 106–07.
Saiger, supra note 8, at 1273.
Solum, supra note 66, at 104.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
See Barnett, supra note 66, at 69 (discussing decision rules for statutory construction).
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not only to judicial statutory construction but also to agency statutory
construction within Chevron’s zone of discretion.
Regime-specific norms inform statutory construction at both
steps of Chevron analysis. At step one, courts consult a statute’s
intelligible principle when determining whether agency statutory
construction is consistent with the statute’s clear and unambiguous
text. An agency’s position must also bear a rational relationship to a
statute’s intelligible principle to satisfy reasonableness review at
Chevron step two. Even when agency statutory interpretations and
constructions qualify for Chevron deference, federal agencies must seek
to interpret and discharge their statutory mandates in good faith.
Trans-substantive norms also inform statutory construction.
Interpretive norms are “trans-substantive” if they are attentive to
systemic concerns that transcend the specific statutory regime under
review. For example, courts demarcate the outer limits of permissible
statutory construction at step one by applying trans-substantive canons
of statutory construction such as the canon of constitutional avoidance,
the rule of lenity, and the canon against extraterritoriality.82 These
traditional tools of statutory construction reflect normative
commitments that either derive from constitutional considerations or
are believed to reflect norms that are embraced by Congress.83 At step
two, a court may also consider general normative considerations such
as rationality, proportionality, and the rule of law in deciding whether
an agency’s proposed construction of a statute is “reasonable.”84
Additionally, courts at step two routinely consider issues associated
with the practical implementation of statutory constructions, such as
agency resource constraints and the impact of an agency’s construction
on other governmental programs, the national economy, and foreign
relations.85 As long as the statute itself does not foreclose consideration

82. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 76–78 (2008).
83. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1376 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) (stating that substantive canons “promote objectives of the legal system which transcend the
wishes of any particular session of the legislature”).
84. See Republican Nat’l Cmt. v. FEC, 76 F.3d 400, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding at step
two that it was not reasonable to “believe that Congress authorized the [Federal Election]
Commission to forbid political committees from accurately stating the law”); Sunstein, supra note
72, at 471 (“In interpreting statutes, courts employ a clear-statement principle in favor of the “rule
of law”: a system in which legal rules exist, are clear rather than vague, do not apply retroactively,
operate in the world as they do in the books, and do not contradict each other.”).
85. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (observing that “[Chevron] deference
in the immigration context is of special importance, for executive officials ‘exercise especially
sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations’ ” (quoting INS v.
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of trans-substantive norms,86 courts may fairly presume that Congress
would have expected the agency to consider such factors during
statutory construction. Accordingly, these trans-substantive norms are
usually legally relevant considerations that federal agencies may take
into account during statutory construction.87
The regime-specific and trans-substantive norms that govern
agency statutory construction apply even within Chevron’s zone of
discretion. Just as agencies are legally obligated to resolve textual
ambiguities by seeking in good faith to adopt the best interpretation of
a statute’s linguistic meaning, they also bear a legal obligation to
conduct statutory construction in a manner that they believe will best
respect and reconcile the relevant normative considerations. This
requirement reflects the Constitution’s continuing operation “outside
the courts” as a legal constraint on executive branch discretion,88 Under
the constitutional principle of legislative supremacy, agencies must
respect these normative considerations as legal conduct rules that
trump their own independent policy preferences and the political
agenda of the incumbent administration.
Chevron is often read to stand for the opposite proposition (i.e.,
that when an agency confronts vague or conflicting statutory principles
or policies, it is free to resort to its own free-standing policy
preferences).89 Toward the end of the decision, the Court gestures
toward this idea in dicta when it distinguishes judicial statutory
construction from agency statutory construction:
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis
of the judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has
delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation,
properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its
judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive

Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. USDA, 789 F.3d 1206, 1224 (11th Cir.
2015) (explaining that resource constraints are relevant to Chevron’s second step).
86. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–35 (2007) (holding that an agency may not
base statutory construction on foreign relations and other policy concerns that are foreclosed by
the statutory text and purpose).
87. Legal scholars have proposed other trans-substantive norms to guide statutory
interpretation at step two, including norms associated with promoting democracy and combatting
domination. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1995) (promoting democracy); Glen Staszewski,
The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209 (2015) (combatting
domination).
88. James E. Fleming, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 215 (2000)
(book
review);
see
also
LARRY
D.
KRAMER,
THE
PEOPLE
THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN
PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004); MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); WHITTINGTON, supra note 66.
89. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 5, at 200.
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is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such
policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.90

By endorsing the idea that agencies may rely on the “wise policy” of the
incumbent administration, the Court arguably encouraged agencies to
look to extra-legal political factors whenever constitutional and
statutory norms do not clearly direct agency statutory construction
toward a specific outcome.
Although many legal scholars have embraced this idea,91 it is not
the only possible reading of Chevron. The assertion that agencies may
make “policy” choices can also be understood, in the alternative, as an
acknowledgement that Congress often requires agencies to take
multiple policy considerations into account when deciding how to
exercise entrusted power. Consequently, statutes regularly task
agencies with “resolving the competing interests which Congress itself
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved
by the agency.”92 Indeed, in Chevron itself, the Court noted that the
Clean Air Act (“CAA”) “plainly identifies the policy concerns that
motivated the enactment,” including not only environmental protection
but also “the allowance of reasonable economic growth.”93 Congress
obviously anticipated that the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) would have to reconcile these disparate legislative priorities
when determining the CAA’s application, and the Supreme Court
wisely deferred to the EPA’s exercise of this entrusted discretionary
judgment. But this does not mean that the EPA was free to base its
reading of the CAA on policies wholly unrelated to the factors Congress
expressly required or implicitly expected the agency to consider.
The traditional reading of Chevron—that agencies may decide
questions of statutory interpretation and construction based on their
own independent policy preferences—is inconsistent with wellestablished principles of administrative law. For decades, the Supreme
Court has recognized that agency action may be set aside as arbitrary
and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)94 if an
agency relies on normative considerations that are divorced from the
legal norms that apply to the action under the Constitution and the

90. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
91. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 5, at 200 (descriptive); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place
for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 8 n.15 (2009) (normative).
92. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.
93. Id. at 863.
94. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
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governing statute.95 In Judulang v. Holder,96 for example, the Court
underscored this requirement to disregard “extraneous” factors that are
“unmoored from the purposes and concerns” of the relevant statute,
explaining that this requirement is a core principle of “reasoned
decision making” that agencies are never legally permitted to
abandon.97 However difficult the task, agencies must fill statutory
“gaps” based on their best understanding of the relevant constitutional
and statutory norms, without regard to extraneous normative factors
such as their own policy preferences or the incumbent administration’s
political agenda. An agency that transgresses this requirement exposes
itself to judicial censure and reversal at Chevron step two,98 because
solicitude to constitutional and statutory principles is an essential
corollary of the nondelegation doctrine, as discussed in Part I. Thus,
Chevron deference is reserved exclusively for agency statutory
constructions that are based on a reasonable effort to recover a statute’s
semantic meaning or distill a statutory provision’s legal meaning from
applicable constitutional and statutory norms.
To be sure, the idea that agencies are legally obligated to conduct
statutory interpretation and construction in good faith—adopting the
reading that they actually believe best captures the statute’s semantic
meaning and best advances the relevant legal norms—does not find
clear expression in many judicial decisions. This should hardly come as
a surprise, given the limited scope of judicial review under Chevron.
Although Chevron requires courts to determine whether an agency’s
statutory interpretation and construction is objectively reasonable, it
does not invite courts to scrutinize an agency’s subjective belief in the
superiority of its chosen position. Thus, although the Constitution
requires that “the Laws be faithfully executed,”99 courts are rarely
called upon to assess whether an agency has actually executed its
statutory mandate in good faith.
95. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
42 (1983) (explaining that agency action may be set aside under arbitrary and capricious review if
“the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider”).
96. 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
97. Id. at 484, 486, 490. In Judulang, the agency action under review involved an exercise of
statutory gap-filling, because the agency purported to exercise statutory authority that was not
conferred expressly by the text of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See id. at 483 n.7.
98. Id. at 483 n.7 (explaining that “arbitrary and capricious” review under the APA is “the
same” as reasonableness review under Chevron step two, because in both contexts “we ask whether
an agency interpretation is arbitrary or capricious in substance” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)); see also Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“We recognize that,
in some respects, Chevron review and arbitrary and capricious review overlap at the margins.”).
Of course, on remand an agency may endorse the same statutory interpretation/construction based
exclusively on permissible criteria.
99. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

346

VAND. L. REV. EN BANC

[Vol. 69:325

Even so, there is some evidence in the case law for the
proposition that agency good faith is a legally binding conduct rule, not
merely an ethical norm. For example, in SKF USA Inc. v. United
States,100 the Commerce Department sought a remand from the Federal
Circuit to allow it to change a previous agency decision that it believed
was incorrect on the merits.101 The circuit court observed that if the
agency’s previous decision raised “a step one Chevron issue—that is, an
issue as to whether the agency is either compelled or forbidden by the
governing statute to reach a different result—a reviewing court . . . has
considerable discretion [to either] decide the statutory issue, or . . .
order a remand.”102 In contrast, “[w]here there is no step one Chevron
issue, . . . a remand to the agency is required, absent the most unusual
circumstances verging on bad faith.”103 The court thus asserted that it
would be appropriate to give the agency an opportunity to select a
reasonable interpretation only if the agency could be expected to make
the decision based on the proper statutory criteria, not based on
unrelated policy or political considerations. As the court found “no
indication whatsoever that [the agency was] acting in bad faith” in the
case at hand, it granted the agency’s request for a remand.104
Nonetheless, the court reserved the right to deny a remand in future
cases where there was evidence that agencies could not be relied upon
to pursue congressional priorities and honor constitutional norms in
good faith.
The Supreme Court likewise has implied that an agency must
adopt the statutory construction that it believes is best in light of the
relevant legal considerations. In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.
(Fox I),105 the Court held that when an agency substitutes one
reasonable statutory construction for another within Chevron’s zone of
discretion,106 “it need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the
reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.”107
Rather, for purposes of judicial review, “it suffices that the new policy
is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and
100. 254 F.3d 1022 (2001).
101. Id. at 1029.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1029–30 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 1030. Some state courts have held, as well, that bad faith is a possible basis for
setting aside discretionary administrative actions. See, e.g., Banfield v. Cortes, 110 A.3d 155, 174
(Pa. 2015).
105. 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
106. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)
(holding that stare decisis does not apply when an agency abandons a reasonable statutory
interpretation in favor a different reasonable interpretation).
107. Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515 (emphasis in original).
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that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of
course adequately indicates.”108 This passage from Fox I is often cited
for the proposition that courts will not probe too deeply into an agency’s
reasons for changing course in statutory interpretation.109 Yet, in the
very same breath the Court also emphasized that federal agencies are
subject to a more demanding conduct rule: they may change course only
if they actually believe that their new statutory interpretation or
construction is superior to its predecessor. Although the Court did not
say that a federal agency must adopt the statutory interpretation or
construction that it considers best, this requirement of good faith
statutory administration is arguably implicit in the Court’s reasoning.
Thus, the Supreme Court appears to agree that federal agencies must
adopt the statutory interpretations and constructions that they actually
believe are best in light of the relevant linguistic and normative
considerations.
Of course, it would be naïve in the extreme to think that an
agency’s legal obligation to interpret its statutory mandate in good faith
can in practice “convert informal rulemaking into a rarified technocratic
process, unaffected by political considerations or the presence of
presidential power.”110 We should approach such claims to technocratic
objectivity with great skepticism—particularly in contexts such as
counter-terrorism, immigration, and gun control that have become
battlegrounds for political partisanship. An agency’s political and policy
commitments will inevitably color its assessment of the best
interpretation of semantic ambiguities in a statute, as well as its efforts
to clarify vague, incomplete, or facially contradictory provisions through
statutory construction.111
It does not follow, however, that the distinction between
statutory construction and autonomous policymaking is illusory. As
Cass Sunstein has observed, it would be a mistake to conclude “that the

108. Id. (emphasis in original).
109. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 555 (2011).
110. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
111. See Foote, supra note 20, at 695 (“[A]gencies carry out statutes with policy agendas, with
expertise, with bureaucratic management objectives, with direct input from special interests and
under express political direction. Judicial-style legal analysis of the intent of the enacting Congress
is not a natural by-product of the administrative process.”); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The ExtraLegislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 400 (2014) (observing that “although it is theoretically possible
for a president to carefully interpret a statute without regard to his policy agenda, it is hard to
imagine”); cf. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 117 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“What judges believe Congress ‘meant’ (apart from the text) has a disturbing but
entirely unsurprising tendency to be whatever judges think Congress must have meant, i.e., should
have meant.”).
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existence of competing, and value-laden, principles is a reason to give
up on the enterprise of statutory construction altogether, . . . to treat
interpretation as inevitably indeterminate, or to rest content with the
conclusion that statutes turn out to mean what people in authority say
that they mean.”112 Even within Chevron’s zone of discretion, agencies
are subject to constitutional and statutory conduct rules that are
designed to channel agency statutory interpretation.113 These conduct
rules are genuine legal obligations. In particular, agencies must use
their entrusted discretionary authority to advance statutory
interpretations that best reflect a statute’s linguistic meaning. And
they must adopt statutory constructions that best constitute a statute’s
legal meaning, in light of the applicable constitutional and statutory
norms. Anything less would eviscerate the Constitution’s “intelligible
principle” requirement by allowing agencies to treat statutory
interpretation as a source of “unfettered” lawmaking power,114 the
classic case of legislative “delegation running riot.”115
CONCLUSION
Conventional wisdom suggests that Chevron deference marks
the border between statutory interpretation and independent agency
policymaking. This view is descriptively inaccurate and prescriptively
unappealing. As Professor Saiger observes, the Chevron doctrine does
not give federal agencies a blank check “to pick whichever
interpretation best advances [their] policy preferences, subject only to
the constraint that [their] selection should survive judicial review.”116
Agencies are not entitled to base their statutory interpretations and
constructions on policy concerns and political considerations that are
unrelated to their statute’s semantic meaning and the legal norms that
comprise their purposive mandate. Instead, agencies bear a legal
112. Sunstein, supra note 72, at 504.
113. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring); see also Saiger, supra note 8, at 1256–57 (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding
Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and
Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 433) (emphasizing Bill Eskridge’s point that
an agency may not decline to pursue congressional goals, or subordinate those goals to other policy
or political considerations, simply because this may call for the agency to exercise discretionary
judgment).
114. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 17 (1939).
115. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (reasoning that courts should not strike
down delegations as overbroad save in “an absence of standards for the guidance” of executive
authority). In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, the Supreme Court explained that an
agency could not cure a standardless delegation by adopting an “intelligible principle” in its own
regulatory guidelines. 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).
116. Saiger, supra note 8, at 1232.
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obligation to interpret statutes in a manner that is faithful to the
Constitution and advances the principles and purposes inscribed in
their statutory mandates.

